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One of the greatest challenges confronting the U. S. Navy-
today is the unquestioned requirement for sound management and
efficiency in our weapons systems acquisition process. Declin-
ing defense budgets, increasing weapons systems costs, and
intensified Congressional interest combine to create an environ-
ment which demands very close scrutinization of the rationale
and justification for decisions made within the Department of
Defense (DOD) . In the past decade, Congressional, committees,
DOD "in-house" Study Groups, the General Accounting Office,
and a Presidential Blue Ribbon Commission have all conducted
in-depth studies in an effort to identify deficiencies which
may be at the root of defense acquisition problems. The find-
ings of these study groups have frequently indicated that many
of the problems which appear can be traced directly to short-
comings in the requirements determination portion of the
acquisition cycle. Specific examples of these shortcomings are
described below:
"Military services. . . .become advocates of specific
methods and approaches to meet their responsibilities.
. . . .Such advocacy leads to parochial choices of
familiar kinds of systems. To encourage a greater
number of more innovative alternative systems to meet

a given need, DOD requests for proposals should be
broadly stated in terms of needed mission capability,
program goals, and essential limitations, not in terms
of required features or performance stipulations keyed
to a particular kind of system. "1
"In recent years, the formalized requirements
documents have been much too specific. Mission
capabilities are spelled out in detail. In addition,
configuration characteristics such as maintainability,
reliability, weight, etc. are usually specified.
Requirements issued in this manner severely limit the
ingenuity of would-be developers. . . .It is recommended
that the Secretary of Defense issue policy guidance to
insure that operational requirements be stated in terms
of broad objectives to encourage imaginative and innova-
tive responses from potential developers."^
Numerous changes have been or are being instituted in DOD/
Navy requirements determination procedures in a continuing
effort to correct acknowledged deficiencies. Periodic evalua-
tion of these changes must be made to determine if increased
effectiveness in the defense systems acquisition process has
been achieved.
B. PURPOSE AND APPROACH
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze current DOD /Navy
requirements determination procedures and evaluate the effec-
tiveness of recent modifications in correcting previously
Ad hoc Sub-committee on Federal Procurement, Report of the
Commission on Government Procurement
,
Vol. 2 Part C, Acquisi-
tion of Major Systems, p. 14, 1972.
o
Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, Appendix E, Report to the
President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of
Defense
, Vol. 6, p. 15, 18, 1970."
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identified shortcomings in this portion of the acquisition
process. The analysis is presented in three parts with the
first being a description of the current (March 1975) require-
3
ments determination process; the second, a discussion on
shortcomings which have not been completely corrected; and
third, recommended modifications required to correct those
deficiencies which still exist.
^The section on current requirements determination procedures
is presented primarily for individuals who are not generally
familiar with this portion of the acquisition process. These
readers who are already well-acquainted with this area are
encouraged to begin their perusal of this thesis at the com-
mencement of the discussion on Potential Problem Areas, page 22.

II. CURRENT PROCEDURES
A. ESTABLISHING NATIONAL AND MILITARY STRATEGIES
The requirements determination process begins with the
development of national security objectives by the National
Security Council (NSC). The NSC publishes its findings and
opinions in the form of National Security Study Memoranda
(NSSM) which, when approved by the President, provide the
basis for National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM) . The
NSDMs used in conjunction with intelligence estimates provided
by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) serve as source
documents for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in their formu-
lation of Military Strategy.
The military strategy formulation process is accomplished
within the framework of the Joint Strategic Planning System
(JSPS) . As a major output of the JSPS, Volume One of the
Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP I) provides appropriate
military strategy for the short and mid-range period (up to
ten years in the future) derived from the national security
objectives delineated by the NSC plus environmental estimates
contained in the Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning (JIEP)
The JIEP is a document prepared by the DIA which describes
various situations and developments that might affect the
10

United States defense capabilities and enumerates possible
courses of action which might be taken by potential enemies.
The long-range period (ten to twenty years) is covered by the
Joint Long Range Strategic Study (JLRSS) which is developed by
the JCS to address the strategic implications of projected
world-wide economic, political, social, and technical trends.
The JLRSS has recently been given a more quantitative flavor
through the use of environmental forecasting techniques based
on regression analysis. The primary environmental input to
the JLRSS is the DIA's Joint Long Range Estimative Intelligence
Document (JLREID) which provides an in-depth appraisal of
trends which are likely to affect world power relationships.
Specific implications for naval forces contained in both
JSOP I and JLRSS are developed and amplified by the Navy's
strategy projection studies. A recently published example of
one of these studies was "Project 2000." The purpose of
"Project 2000" was to examine trends which are most likely to
affect the shape of the Navy through the last quarter of the
twentieth century. Such studies represent a valuable approach
to long-range planning of naval forces but must be continually




B. ASSESSMENT OF FORCE POSTURE
The assessment of force posture required to implement
national strategy is performed concurrently by OSD, JCS, and
the individual services. Assessment capabilities have been
markedly enhanced in the last few years.
"Prior to 1970, force planning guidance provided for
assessments to be accomplished under the assumption that
the United States would be involved in 2\ wars simulta-
neously (i.e. major conflicts with both the USSR and the
Peoples Republic of China (PRC) plus a brushfire engage-
ment) . Since this assumption resulted in assessments
which indicated an unrealistically weak force posture,
the guidance was changed to provide for the use of 1%
war scenario. This was still an extremely pessimistic
assumption, however, which did not provide much latitude
for an examination of force posture trade-offs. Conse-
quently, the guidance was again revised in order to
delineate six different scenarios which are relevant for
planners of general-purpose forces:
1. A full-scale war with the USSR in the NATO region.
2. A major conflict in Asia involving U. S. defense
of allies against PRC aggression.
3. Unilateral military action by the U. S., not
involving direct confrontation with the USSR or PRC.
4. A limited confrontation with the USSR outside
NATO.
5. Protection of maritime security.
6. Adequate peacetime 'presence' forces.
"While the first three scenarios are basically the
same as those included in the ?.k or 1% war guidance,
separating them and adding the last three scenarios
provides much more flexibility due to the fact they can
be utilized individually or in combination according to
the needs dictated by specific situations. Although more
12

detailed specification will be required in order to
provide a truly uniform basis for force planning trade-
off decisions, the delineation of these six individual
scenarios is a definite step in that direction. "4-
Another important innovation has been the creation of
special panels dedicated to the task of developing assessments
at both the OSD and Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
(OPNAV) levels. These panels are tasked with the responsibility
for performing "a comparative analysis of those military,
technological, political, and economic factors which impede or
have a potential to impede our national security objectives,
with those factors available or potentially available to
enhance accomplishment of these same national security objec-
tives." "While the OSD net assessment organization is still
in the formative stages, its Navy counterpart has already had
an impact on planning activities. Situated within the Office
of Navy Program Planning (OP-090) , this group has several
important functions. Besides being the central clearing house
for all Navy assessment activities (e.g. the SEAMIX Study Group).
it is responsible for updating the 'CNO Net Assessment of the
United States and Soviet Navies' as well as performing other
^"Jordan, R. L.
,
The Requirements Determination Process for
Major Naval Weapon Systems: A Procedural Analysis
, Master's
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1974.




assessments independently and in conjunction with OSD (e.g. The
Navy Missions Study). As it matures, this organization should
provide the direction for Navy assessment activities that was
so sorely deficient prior to 1973."°
Yet another major change at both the OSD and OPNAV levels
has been to augment Defense Policy and Planning Guidance
(DPPG) prepared by OSD and CNO Planning and Programming Guidance
(CPPG) prepared by the Chief of Naval Operations with the
Extended Planning Annex (EPA) and the Extended Planning
Guidance (EPG) respectively. The action resulted from the
realization that the traditional guidance documents were not
adequate for long-range force planning and assessment purpose
because of their relatively short (eight-year) horizon. The
EPA and EPG lengthen the guidance horizon by ten years and
thereby provide a common framework for long-range plans through-
out the Navy and DOD . In addition, the CNO Program Analysis
Memorandum (CPAM) development process has been broadened to
give explicit attention to the long-range Research and Develop-
ment (R&D) issues which had previously been excluded by the
same eight-year horizon. CPAMs treat mission and support
areas in terms of cost and capabilities and furnish the basis
for consideration of broad program alternatives.
Jordan, R. L. , The Requirements Determination Process for
Major Naval Weapon Systems: A Procedural Analysis
,
Master's
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1974.
14

Remaining noteworthy documents in the assessment of force
posture process include Defense Intelligence Projections for
Planning (DIPP), JSOP Volume Two and the Navy's Force and
Mission Sponsor Plans. The DIPP is prepared by the DIA and
contains military force projections for the USSR and the
Peoples Republic of China. In developing JSOP II, JCS uses
inputs from JLRSS, DPPG/EPA and DIPP to prepare an assessment
of potential enemy force projections. The Force and Mission
Sponsor Plans are prepared by the various Deputy CNOs (DCNO)
in OPNAV (e.g. DCNO Air Warfare, DCNO Surface Warfare and
DCNO Submarine Warfare) and set forth, "as concisely and
coherently as feasible, the sponsor perceived force/mission
needs necessary to carry out CPPG guidance."'
C. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
The R&D needs of the services are monitored by the JCS
through the preparation of the Joint Research and Development
Objectives Document (JRDOD) . The purpose of the JRDOD is to
translate the JLRSS and JSOP implications for future capability
needs into specific R&D objectives. This process assists
SECDEF in the orientation of the total Defense R&D programs.
7OPNAV Instruction 5000.42, 1 June 1974, Weapon System
Selection and Plannin g.
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The Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) is
concurrently involved in this effort through development of
Area Coordinating Papers (ACP) , Mission Concept Papers (MCP)
and Mission Area Summaries (MAS) . These documents are designed
to provide SECDEF with an overview of each mission area by-
identifying existing or projected problems and describing
current programs for dealing with them.
The Navy's current procedures for identifying operations
requirements and conducting management review during the R&D
process were established by OPNAVINST 5000.42 of 1 June 1974.
This instruction (included as Appendix A) represents the
Navy's latest thinking in the area of requirements determina-
tion and attempts to incorporate the "thrust" of the
recommendations made by the Commission on Government Procure-
o
ment in their report of December 1972. Under the new
procedures, the Director Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation (OP-098) prepares the Navy R&D Plan concordant with
the CPPG, EPG, Force and Mission Sponsor Plans, JRDOD , etc.
This plan serves as the primary guide to the research and
development community for the establishment of future programs
and consists of Science and Technology Objectives (STO) and
approved Operational Requirements. The STOs are prepared by
o
Letter from Admiral J. L. Holloway, III, to Senator
Lawton Chiles, 13 December 1974.
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OP-098 and describe, in broad terms, the Navy's needs and
problems requiring R&D solutions and are based on the Navy's
role, objectives, and anticipated threat for the ten to twenty
year future time frame. One STO is to be developed and main-
tained for each of the Research, Development, Test and Evalua-










III. Projection of Power Ashore
A. Amphibious Warfare






B. Support and Logistics
C. Ocean Surveillance
D. Command, Control, and Communications
The Naval Material Command (NAVMAT) , as the "producer"
representative in the Navy requirements definition dialogue,
responds to the STO with a new document called Navy Advanced
Concepts (NAC) . Its purpose is to outline the Advanced Systems
Concepts (ASC) prepared by the various systems commands
(SYSCOMS) as an aid to OPNAV sponsors in refining their
perceptions of need as expressed in the STOs . In a parallel
role at the OSD level, DDR&E produces Technology Coordinating
Papers (TCP) to provide SECDEF with an outline of new or
improved capabilities believed to be reasonably attainable in
the forseeable future.
The Force and Mission Sponsors then issue Operational
Requirements (OR) as they are able to define the specific
performance parameters needed which are within the state of
the art as reflected in the NAC. The OR is designed to be a
concise statement of operational needs, limited to three pages
in length, it appears to be an attempt to state requirements
in terms of broad objectives to encourage imaginative and
18

innovative responses from potential developers. ORs which
will clearly lead to major weapon system acquisitions, or will
require costly R&D programs, or early conceptual effort are
submitted to the CNO Executive Board (CEB) and the Acquisition
Review Committee (ARC) for concurrence prior to promulgation.
The ARC functions as a sub panel of the CEB and is composed of
the Director, Navy Program Planning (chairman), Director,
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations (Logistics), Force and Mission Sponsor(s),
and CNM representatives.
When an approved OR is promulgated by OPNAV, NAVMAT responds
with a Development Proposal (DP) . The DP presents a range of
alternatives and trade-offs to achieve the particular range of
capabilities solicited by the OR.. Included in the DP are
applicable estimates of development cost, unit cost of
production model, degree of relative improvement over existing
systems, etc. "It is anticipated that an iterative process
will be developed through an informal dialogue between the
cognizant OPNAV sponsor and NAVMAT to prepare the DP."" It is
hoped that through this avenue it will be possible to resolve
all questions in relation to the statement of requirement (OR)





and the development of the alternatives available to fulfill
the requirement (DP)
.
Once an approved OR and its attendant DP have defined the
proposed system alternatives, a Navy Development Paper (NDCP)
is drafted and reviewed by the CEB/ARC for the purpose of
designating the CNO-preferred alternative and authorizing
commencement of the conceptual development phase. The NDCP
document includes a definition of program issues, the considera^
tion which support the operational need, program objectives,
program plans, performance parameters, areas of risk, and
development alternatives.
Upon completion of the conceptual efforts, a Decision
Coordinating Paper (DCP) is drafted and submitted to the CEB/
ARC. If approved, it proceeds to the Department of the Navy
Systems Acquisition Review Council (DNSARC) , composed of
SECNAV and his Assistants plus CNO and the Commandant of the
Marine Corps. This body provides the final pre-SECDEF program
validation and establishes the Department of the Navy position
on the development alternatives. The DCP is then forwarded to




The current DOD , Navy Requirements Determination Process
described in the preceeding paragraphs of this section are
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III. POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS
The evolutionary changes leading up to the current DOD/NAV
requirements determination process (as described in Part II) do
reflect an acknowledgment of documented criticism and indicate
a positive effort to correct identified shortcomings. Organ-
izing RDT&E planning categories in consonance with the basic
Navy mission areas of Strategic Deterrence, Sea Control,
Projection of Power Ashore, and Mission Support has been
directly responsive to the Commission on Government Procurement's
recommendation concerning the delineation of ongoing R&D programs
by mission area rather than appropriation category. The docu-
ment exchange process between OPNAV and NAVMAT has been greatly
simplified and abbreviated, thereby reducing some of the
emphasis on detailed requirements and helping to foster the
development of more innovative alternatives. In addition, the
more streamlined process appears to offer a more effective
balance between informal dialogue and the necessary review and
control attributes of a formally documented process.
A significant weakness which remains in the current Navy
requirements determination process is the designation of the
various DCNOs as Force and Mission Sponsors. Assuming that
the Navy perceives its basic missions as being coincident with
the areas listed in the RDT&E Planning Categories (as listed in
22

Figure 1) it appears incongruous that OPNAV should designate
individuals that primarily represent platform types (e.g., air,
surface, and submarines) as Mission Sponsors. The potential
problem areas which remain uncorrected by having "Platform
Sponsors" redesignated as Mission Sponsors are discussed in the
following paragraphs.
A. PRODUCT ORIENTATION OF DCNOs
The Navy is in a sense a coalition of competing viewpoints
fostered by what are really three navies (air, surface, and
subsurface) and the Marine Corps. 10 Although now classified
as Force and Mission Sponsors, the "Big Three" of the OPNAV
structure; DCNO Subsurface Warfare (OP-02) , DCNO Surface War-
fare (OP-03) , and DCNO Air Warfare (OP-05) , each have a natural
inclination to become advocates of specific methods and
approaches to meet their responsibilities. Indeed, it may
even be stated that the various platform-type interests are
sometimes antagonistic because in a fixed budget situation,
more submarines means submariners get more opportunities for
promotion while pilots get less, etc. Thus, DCNO Air Warfare
has a propensity toward developing, procuring, and operating
aircraft rather than truly sponsoring a given mission area
10Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, Appendix N, Report to the
President and the Secretary of Defense on the De partment of
Defense
,
V. 15, p. 6.
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such as Strategic Deterrence or Projection of Power Ashore.
Similarly, the DCNOs for Surface and Subsurface Warfare are
primarily interested in developing, producing, and operating
ships and submarines respectively. The Armed Services have
been criticized in the past because such advocacy has led to
parochial choices of familiar platform systems. Given
platform-biased Mission Sponsors who are interested in any
mission in general as long as it can be accomplished by the
platform they advocate, it is highly likely that this short-
coming will continue to flourish in the current Navy requirements
determination process.
1. Organizational Impact
Force and Mission Sponsors play key roles in the Navy's
current requirements determination process. The DCNOs are
tasked with developing Force and Mission Sponsor Plans which
contain guidance for the introduction of new or modernized
systems and set forth user (operating force) needs and objec-
tives in consonance with CNO Planning and Programming Guidance.
In addition, as members of the Acquisition Review Committee
(ARC), they have a major part in the validation and promulga-
tion of the primary control elements (e.g., OR, NDCP, and DCP)
i:LAd Hoc Sub-Committee on Federal Procurement:, Report of
The Commission on Government Procurement , Vol. 2, Part C,
Acquisition of Major Systems, p. 14.
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which make up the formal documentation process. Service Branch
Staffs have been faulted in the past for being unable to divorce
themselves from special branch interests in establishing
priorities for mission requirements. 12 In view of the platform-
oriented position of the DCNOs and their central position to
the requirements determination process, it appears that this
deficiency may continue to exist in the Navy's revised organi-
zation.
2. Restrictive Statements of Need
The statement of need is a key decision point and such
statements should initially be understood as a presentation of
a problem for which a system solution is sought. Platform-
oriented Sponsors lead to formal statements of needs which
often describe a design concept for a specific system rather
than a description of a mission deficiency which warrants the
examination of alternative solutions. These statements of need,
called ORs in the current process, must clearly separate the
operational need (mission deficiency) from the system solution
(product) , and present program goals independent of a particular
system. In the past, one statement of mission need called not
only for a "new manned aircraft, but also specified the take-off
12Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, Appendix E, Report to the
Presiden t and the Secretary of Defense on the Denartment_of
Defense , V. 6, p. 15.
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(or has been) created to justify the "desirability" of having
a new system. In all fairness, it should be pointed out that
a requirement can also be generated by new technology which
promises a new system to perform an existing mission in a more
effective manner. All too often, however, this sort of promise
provides only marginal improvement at much greater cost. New
technology for the sake of newness must go by the boards as
must the development of requirements which are nice-to-have
vice need-to--have.
B. PRODUCTION VICE LIFE CYCLE COST CONSCIOUSNESS
The use of life cycle costing techniques, as a prime
selection parameter of new weapon systems, has been dictated by
DOD directives. Unfortunately, lack of sophisticated and
accurate life cycle cost modeling techniques and limited methods
of enforcing the use of those (inexact) life cycle cost techniques
that are available have significantly restricted the value and
use of life cycle cost as a viable selection parameter. Theo-
retically, the selection of a new weapon system should be
predicated on lowest life cycle cost, assuming alternatives
are adequately performance capable. This means that among
suitable alternatives, the concept design, or system with the
lowest cummulative development, procurement, and operating cost,
as measured over the system's expected life, should be the
30

and NAVMAT. This duplication of effort results in what could
be characterized as a "Producer-Producer dialogue," supplanting
the desired user-producer dialogue. The intended iterative
process of OPNAV articulating tasks, roles, and missions, and
NAVMAT responding with designs, costs and trade-off analysis
may not take place. For example, consider the most likely
response of DCNO Air Warfare to an increased need in the Anti-
Air Warfare portion of the Sea Control mission. A probable
response might be the preparation of an OR which x^ould specify
an aircraft type of system to be developed through the joint
efforts of OP-05 and the Naval Air Systems Command. Hence,
both OPNAV and NAVMAT end up acting as co-producers of a specific
platform approach. Perhaps the most cost-effective response to
the increased anti-air warfare need in this instance would have
been a surface-launched missile developed by NAVSEA or an
electronic warfare system developed by NAVELEX. A mission-
oriented sponsor would be more likely to prepare a statement of
need which would state increased anti-air warfare needs in terms
broad enough to elicit development proposal (DP) responses from
as many NAVMAT System Commands as possible. Responses from the
System Commands would not be limited to a single best offering
(multiple alternatives from as many System Commands as possible
are desired); and the development proposals might range, tech-
nologically, from radical new conceptual proposals to design
27

modifications of existing systems. The objective of the dialogue,
in any case, would be to provide as many alternative proposals
(DPs) as possible in order to allow the Mission Sponsor the
greatest possible latitude in selecting a system to optimize
his mission requirements/capabilities.
4. Follow-On Imperative
Closely allied to the problems of restrictive statements
of need and the producer-producer dialogue, is the problem of
the follow-on imperative. Most major acquisition programs have
been initiated in order to provide replacements for existing
weapons. Specific requirements for replacements have frequently
been assumed without the benefit of the type of thorough analysis
that a new system might be subjected to. ^ This particular
bias on the part of platform-oriented Force and Mission Sponsors
assumes that there is a requirement to replace existing major
systems with succeeding generations of similar systems on a one
for one basis; i.e. Trident system replaces Polaris system; P-3
and S-3 aircraft replace P-2 and S-2 aircraft; and Spruance class
destroyers replace Gearing class destroyers. Since the develop-
ment managers have a motivation to supply the sponsor's demand
and the demands are for systems which are frequently little more
G. J. Chasko and F. W. Hulvershorn, Requirements





than improved versions of the old systems, development motiva-
tion will be directed toward improving existing subsystems and
components. Hence, alternative systems are seldom proposed to
the sponsors.
5. Acquisition Precedes Need
The Final Report of Project Hindsight observed that up
to seventy-five percent of requirements were established while
a weapons system is being developed. 15 This statement tends to
correlate with the hypothesis that product pre-occupation pre-
vails over mission requirements. Needs have been expressed in
terms of a product rather than a mission function to be performed
because preliminary design studies of a system have often preceded
the initial requirement for an operational capability. b "The
large number of iterations on the PF (Patrol Frigate) design
would seem to indicate that its role or mission had not been
clearly defined beforehand," 17 yet OP-03 knew that he "needed"
at least fifty of these new vessels. The question should be
asked whether the system fulfills a need or if the need must be
^Commission on Government Procurement, Final Report - Study
Group #12
, p. 183.
16Ad Hoc Sub Committee on Federal Procurement, Report of the
Commission on Government Procurement , Vol. 2, Part C, Acquisition
of Major Systems, p. 42.
17RADM R. C. Gooding, USN, Memorandum for the Chief of Naval
Material , Ser 38, Sep 3 - 1974, p. 1.
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(or has been) created to justify the "desirability" of having
a new system. In all fairness, it should be pointed out that
a requirement can also be generated by new technology which
promises a new system to perform an existing mission in a more
effective manner. All too often, however, this sort of promise
provides only marginal improvement at much greater cost. New
technology for the sake of newness must go by the boards as
must the development of requirements which are nice-to-have
vice need-to-have.
B. PRODUCTION VICE LIFE CYCLE COST CONSCIOUSNESS
The use of life cycle costing techniques, as a prime
selection parameter of new weapon systems, has been dictated by
DOD directives. Unfortunately, lack of sophisticated and
accurate life cycle cost modeling techniques and limited methods
of enforcing the use of those (inexact) life cycle cost techniques
that are available have significantly restricted the value and
use of life cycle cost as a viable selection parameter. Theo-
retically, the selection of a new weapon system should be
predicated on lowest life cycle cost, assuming alternatives
are adequately performance capable. This means that among
suitable alternatives, the concept design, or system with the
lowest cummulative development, procurement, and operating cost,
as measured over the system's expected life, should be the
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alternative selected for procurement. Differences in life
cycles of various alternatives must be suitably equated to allow
objective evaluation. Under the current Congressional budgetary
format and product advocacy of Force and Mission Sponsors,
development managers are more oriented to production cost than
life cycle cost. The pressure is on development managers to
keep the production cost as low as possible and to insure
delivery of new systems in accordance with strict Initial
Operating Capability (IOC) dates. Pressure on delivery schedule
is frequently a fall-out of the follow-on imperative in which
acquisition of a new model is needed to replace the old model
being phased out. Reduction of production cost may be at the
expense of increased operating costs in such areas as relia-
bility, maintainability, availability, etc. Since the long-term
operating costs of a new system are frequently several times
the production cost, the importance of life cycle costing
becomes apparent.
As a sub issue of this section, it should also be pointed
out that acquisition development managers are affected by
hardware competition at the sponsor level. If, for example,
the production cost of a new fighter aircraft is exceeding
budgeted cost, OP-05 (DCNO Air Warfare) may: reduce the original
purchase quantity of fighter aircraft, decrease aircraft perform-
ance parameters (and unit cost) , increase projected IOC dates
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(lengthen acquisition cycle) or lobby to reprogram funds from
another OP-05 sponsored program (i.e. ASW, aircraft program,
strike aircraft program, etc.) to support the entire fighter
aircraft program. In any case, this type of situation impacts
heavily on force level structures and may not permit an
equitable distribution of funds to all mission areas.
C. DETERMINATION OF NEEDS AND SELECTION OF SYSTEMS IN ISOLATION
OF TOTAL SERVICE CAPABILITY
Perhaps the most exasperating difficulty fostered by plat-
form-biased Force and Mission Sponsors is that only a limited
amount of mission overview is provided below the CNO level.
The CNO ' s Systems Analysis Division, OP-96, is organized by
mission area and has primary responsibility for the Navy's
analytical planning and programming effort. However, it must
be recognized that it is not possible to run a large organiza-
tion with only an analytical approach. The Deputy CNOs for
submarine, air, and surface combatant forces clearly outrank
and outnumber OP-96, and each have a major interest in sponsoring
R&D and procurement in their platform areas. No one Mission
Sponsor maintains a continuous, current perspective of a given
mission area's total needs and capabilities. Program decisions
may be made without regard to current or proposed efforts by
32

other branches related to the same mission-^ and certainly no
single Sponsor is in a position to compare the cost effective-
ness values of concurrently developed/operated systems in any
of the mission areas.
Thus several of today's Force and Mission Sponsors could be
developing/operating what they consider optimized ASW systems;
yet, there may be great cost-effectiveness differences between
individual systems. Programs should not be initiated/operated
independently from total agency capability, needs, and resources.
It sometimes appears that each branch of the Navy is striving
to acquire an arsenal of weapons complete in itself to carry
out any and all possible missions. The goal should be to
eliminate unplanned, uncontrolled, unaffordable duplication of
system capabilities, both within the Navy and DOD, where such
duplication is unwarranted or not cost effective. There is
clearly a need to balance the acquisition process by ensuring
a more objective exploration and selection of alternative
systems to meet mission needs. This dictates the need for a
critical, unbiased, and interdisciplinary review and evaluation
of: assumptions; technical and strategic analyses; test results;
"I o





and system specifications by persons professionally qualified
and experienced in the practice of system definition and
development, independent of direct control by system advocates
The current OPNAV structure inhibits this eventuality. In
addition to the lack of total overview of mission areas by
the Navy, Congress is denied adequate budgetary overview.
"There is no effective mechanism to appraise Congress of the
rationale behind an aggregate of mission needs and their
relative priorities. X7
19Chasko and Hulvershorn, Requirements Determin a tion of
Major Weapon Systems , p. 48.
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IV. RECOMMENDED MODIFICATIONS TO CURRENT STRUCTURE
The problem areas discussed in Part III of this analysis
suggest that the Navy's current Weapons System Selection and
Planning procedures, as established in OPNAVINST 5000.42, do
not correct several significant deficiencies in the require-
ments determination process:
* Product (platform) Vice Mission Orientation
* Production vice Life Cycle Cost Consciousness
* Determination of Needs and Selection of Systems
in Isolation of Total Service/ (DOD) Capability
In order to satisfy the need for critical, unbiased revievz and
evaluation of threats and needs, system specifications, test
results, and alternative approaches to mission requirements, it
is recommended that the DCNO/Mission and Force Sponsor organiza-
tion of OPNAV be restructured as follows: Replace the existing
DCNO Warfare Areas (OP-02, OP-03 and OP-05) and DCNO Logistics
(OP-04) with DCNO Mission Areas which are coincident with the
RDT&E Planning Categories of Strategic Deterrence, Sea Control,
Projection of Power Ashore, and Mission Support. Thus, each
Mission and Force Sponsor will no longer represent a specific
type of platform but will be responsible for an entire (and
true) mission area. The basic document flow process established
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by OPNAVINST 5000.42 appears sound and would remain essentially
unchanged as depicted in Figure 3.
Under the restructured OPNAV organization proposed above,
CPPGs and CPAMs
,
generated by the Office of Navy Program
Planning (OP-090) and OP-96 respectively, would be used by CNO
to evaluate and compare current mission capabilities with over-
all Navy/JCS/OSD requirements. This comparison would form the
basis for annual SECDEF/SECNAV/CNO allocation of Navy funds by
mission areas, with deficient mission areas receiving additional
funding to achieve necessary levels of capability.
The Mission and Force Sponsors under the proposed system
would be responsible for funding; R and D, procurement and
operation/maintenance costs of all weapons systems within
their respective mission area. The goal of this approach would
be to fix mission responsibility and have each Sponsor strive
to maximize his mission area's capability within given budgetary
limits. Under this process, each Mission and Force Sponsor
would reallocate his R and D, procurement and operation/mainte-
nance funds among the sub -miss ion areas which make up his total
mission area. Existing OPNAV Directorships such as the Director
of ASW Programs and the Director Command, Control, and Communica-
tions would become part of the Mission Area structure as depicted
by the proposed mission area breakdowns presented in Figures 4
through 7. When a requirement to increase mission capability
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in a given sub-area is forcasted, the Sponsor would update his
Force and Mission plan in consonance with the CPPG and EPG and
coordinate with OP-98 to ensure the STO for the mission area
reflects the new, long-range objectives. When an OR is issued,
the Mission Sponsor would state the operational need in broad
terms, independent of a system product. The Naval Material
Command would respond by circulating the broad-based OR to all
of its technical bureaus, laboratories and research centers.
The development proposals from each of the responding SysComs
would then be submitted to the Mission Sponsor/CEB for selection
of a preferred approach. For his part, the Mission Sponsor
would analyze and compare the projected effectiveness,
acquisition costs, and life cycle costing of competing alterna-
tives and, in addition, compare projected parameters of these
competing alternatives with the actual (historical) effectiveness
and life cycle costing of systems currently in his mission
inventory. Given his broad mission overview and budgetary
constraints, the Mission Sponsor may opt to:
1. Reduce or eliminate one or more current systems
in favor of a more cost-effective new alternative.
2. Expand current systems if they are more cost-
effective than new proposed alternatives.
3. Reject all DPs in favor of continued R and D effort
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Implicit in this entire analysis and decision process is the
assumption that all new alternatives (submitted via DPs) and
current systems in being, will be compared and analyzed as to
cost effectiveness utilizing similar evaluation criteria. In
this vein it should be recognized that the organizational
collation of mission-oriented systems under a Mission Sponsor
will require a significant initial effort to identify individual
current systems cost of ownership (Operating and maintenance
costs) and establish a standard mission method or model for
determining individual current system effectiveness. This
initial effort will allow a pragmatic cost-effectiveness
comparison of current mission systems and proposed future
alternatives (DPs). Although perhaps time consuming, it is
imperative to determine "where we are" with regard to total
mission capability and cost effectiveness before determining
"where to go" in terms of future acquisitions. Reflection at
this point is a requisite for mission capability optimization.
Thus, various "platform type" systems could be evaluated as
to individual sub-mission area cost effectiveness, and that
(those) system(s) selected which would most enhance the mission
capability vis-a-vis cost effectiveness. In this situation, it
is entirely possible that the most cost-effective sub-mission
area alternative is not the most cost-effective mission area
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selection, i.e., the effect of overall mission area synergism
may dictate system selection.
The results of this proposed organizational change should
thus be to:
1. Optimize mission area capabilities through the
elimination of unplanned, uncontrolled and
unaffordable duplication of weapon systems and
wastage of scarce resources.
2. Establish and operate within a total mission area
budget in which all systems (new and old) should
be acquired, operated, and maintained.
3. Establish objective methods of determining mission
area capabilities or deficiencies and for selecting
systems to eliminate or reduce mission deficiencies
in the most cost-effective manner.
4. Establish realistic time-phased plan for introduction
of systems to eliminate or reduce mission area
deficiencies
.
5. Allow greater Congressional oversight of acquisition





A. RESOLUTION OF EXISTING PROBLEMS
1. Problem IIIA; Product Orientation of DCNOs
Divorced from the grip of premature platform advocacy,
mission area sponsors should provide more objectivity in de-
fining and evaluating Navy needs with regard to mission area
deficiencies. Competition for funds among mission sponsors
should be anticipated, but competition at the mission area level
is more constructive than competition at the platform level.
Mission area sponsors (DCNOs) would continue to impact
heavily in the requirements determination process but in a
specific mission area instead of performing the role of plat-
form advocate. While DCNOs would specify the boundary condi-
tions that must be met by any system, including constraints on
physical size, operating conditions, tactics and the talents of
users; the role of system and platform advocate would essentially
be returned to the Naval Material Command where it belongs (i.e.
NAVAIRSYSCOM advocates the acquisition of a new aircraft and
the Mission Sponsor compares NAVAIR's proposal with the other
SYSCOM recommended alternatives prior to making a selection)
.
Thus OPNAV/DCNOs would focus on mission and strategy problems
while NAVMAT/SYSCOMS would focus on conceptual and design
problems
.
As a mission vice a platform sponsor, the statements of
mission area needs leading to operational requirements (ORs)
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will be broad enough to allow full participation by all technical
bureaus within NAVMAT. These open-ended problem vice solution-
oriented ORs will allow the introduction of innovative new
alternatives to meet mission area needs.
The re-establishment of NAVMAT as the producer responding
to broad OPNAV (user) mission requirements will convert the
existing "producer-producer" relationship to the desired "user-
producer" relationship.
Since the mission area sponsor will be interested solely
in optimizing his mission area capability, within budgetary
restraints, he will be less susceptible to the problems of the
"follow-on imperative." Rather than feeling constrained to
accept the next generation of an existing system, the mission
sponsor will be continually faced with the problem of optimizing
total mission capability and will only accept a follow-on
initiative if it proves mission-area cost effective relevant to
other mission alternatives.
Recognizing the high price of entry into new technology,
the mission sponsor will only introduce it when absolutely
necessary and should thus preclude himself from indulgence in
acquisition which precede a mission requirement/need.
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2. Problem IIIB; Acquisition Vice Life Cycle Cost
Consciousness
Since mission sponsors will be required to fund the
cost of mission systems operation and maintenance as well as
acquisition cost, there will be much stronger motivation to
base selection of a preferred system(s) on life cycle costing.
Life cycle costs often represent a value many times the acquisi-
tion cost of a system and, even at a realistically discounted
present value, may represent the significant cost parameter of
a new/existing system.
3. Problem IIIC; Determination of Needs and Selection in
Isolation of Total Service Capability
Collation of all mission capabilities and deficiencies
under the accountability and responsibility of a single mission
sponsor will prevent the determination of needs (ORs) and
selection of systems in isolation of total service capability.
The total package presentation of a single mission area's
capabilities and limitations coupled with early visibility of
the alternatives being considered by the mission sponsor to
eliminate mission soft spots will enhance Congressional overview
of Navy defense spending and increase Congressional confidence
in acquisition programs.
The fact that Congress is committed to the principle of
itemization in order to achieve the maximum degree of control
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and oversight is not inimical to the broader presentation of
budget requests by mission areas. Itemization within each
mission area can readily be provided for R and D, Operations
and Maintenance (O&M) , Military Construction (MILCON)
,
Shipbuilding and Conversion (SCN) and other appropriation
categories
.
B. NEW ORGANIZATION - NEW PROBLEMS
1. Any change initiated to correct existing problems
invariably creates new and different problems of its own, and
the proposed organizational change of OPNAV is no exception.
One of the first potential problem areas to be addressed under
the new organizational structure is the existence of multi-
mission platforms. While the current organization creates a
situation in which "everyone worries about platforms but no one
worries about missions," the proposed organizational change
might foster a climate in which "everyone worries about missions
and no one worries about platforms." Specifically, we could
now have a situation in which two or more Mission Sponsors,
preoccupied with their particular mission areas, were sharing
a particular platform.
Fortunately, under the proposed OPNAV organization, most
current platforms (ship hulls and aircraft) will fall into a
single mission area (Sea Control, Projection of Power Ashore
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and Strategic Deterrence) and should preclude this eventuality.
The most notable exception, of course, is the current inventory
of aircraft carriers which fulfill roles in three of the new
mission areas.
In the case of development, procurement, operation and
maintenance funding for multi-mission platforms, each mission
area sponsor (DCNO) would fund his attendant "mission percentage"
of the multi-mission platform cost. This percentage funding by
two or more Mission Sponsors may also have the additional
benefit of reducing the cost of major acquisitions in that no
one Mission Sponsor will be willing to finance excess capability
or "gold plating" of the platform. Requiring the approval of
all cognizant Mission Sponsors for engineering change proposals,
configuration changes, price changes, and operation and main-
tenance cost changes should help to stabilize the planning and
funding parameters of major acquisition projects. Perhaps a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) similar to the type used in
NATO projects could be adapted for use in assessing mission
funding levels for production (SCN) and annual operation and
maintenance costs (O&M) of multi-mission platforms. These joint
funds could then be administered by that DCNO having primary
interest in the platform (Prime DCNO) . Implicit in this proposal
is the right of any DCNO providing partial multi-mission platform
funding (SCN or O&M) to withdraw his support if production or
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operation and maintenance costs of the multi -miss ion platform
increase substantially above the MOU levels and render the
platform's cost effectiveness non-competitive with other mission
systems. In this case, the Prime DCNO may have to provide
additional funding of his own to cover the increased cost, gain
additional funding support from other DCNOs remaining in the
program or initiate platform trade-offs to reduce costs to
originally agreed upon levels and thus retain all original
cognizant DCNO funding support.
Short of this, an alternative action could be to design
smaller, less costly single mission ships. In view of the
proposed organization of OPNAV/DCNOs into mission areas, this
may become a more operationally and economically attractive
alternative (i.e. ships/planes would be designed specifically
for Sea Control, Projection of Power Ashore and Strategic
Deterrence). For example, an evolutionary process might lead
to smaller aircraft carriers optimized for sea control with
larger carriers maintained for Projection and Strategic missions
Additionally, an escort group consisting of six 4000-6000 ton
destroyers, each capable of helo operations, might be replaced
at decreased cost and increased effectiveness by five 1500-2000
ton destroyers, no helo capability, and one 12,000-15,000 ton




Although mission orientation will predominate at the OPNAV
level, it should be possible for the cognizant technical bureaus
of NAVMAT (NAVAIR, NAVSEA, etc.) to adequately protect platform
integrity and thereby avoid any loss of platform "spokesmanship"
due to an OPNAV reorganization.
2. A major problem associated with the proposed OPNAV
reorganization is the sheer numbers of people and bureaucracies
affected. The people concerned must realize that the change is
not being recommended to correct any gross failure on their
part but to ensure their continued success by realigning the
OPNAV organization along more effective mission-oriented lines.
It is understood that there appears to have been a real need
for a DCNO Air when it was established in August of 1943.
Under the bilinear Navy Department of that period, naval
aviation proponents recognized that a narrow view of aviation
dominated the thinking of the senior Navy hierarchy and foresaw
the requirement for stronger representation within the office
of the Chief of Naval Operations. The Bureau of Aeronautics
and DCNO Air combined to provide an integrated approach to
aviation matters which helped to guide the rapid growth of
naval air capabilities within the bilinear system. Similarly,
with the advent of the Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine,
submarine warfare acquired new dimensions well beyond that of
seeking out and destroying enemy shipping. Well aware of the
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successful naval aviation model, the submarine community used
this increased capability to wage war as a means of getting
their own DCNO and being officially recognized as a distinct
category of naval warfare. Now that the need for strong naval
aviation and submarine capabilities has been clearly established
and the Naval hierarchy has learned to look beyond the splash
of a sixteen-inch shell, the requirement for a special DCNO
to represent each platform area is no longer necessary to insure
a balanced Navy. It is, therefore, concluded that a realignment
of DCNOs along mission lines can be considered without fear of
compromising the overall effectiveness of the requirements
determination process.
The DCNOs will not be losing any of their power under the
proposed OPNAV realignment but will be channeling their efforts
in a less parochial manner for the overall benefit of the Navy.
In addition, career patterns, opportunities and training for
naval officers will be greatly enhanced by providing a broader
perspective of naval strategies and tactics. Mission orienta-
tion at the DCNO level will permit exposure of naval officers
to any or all of the mission areas vice limited exposure to
currently platform-oriented DCNO structures. Thus aviation,
submarine and surface officers alike would be equally acceptable
in all Mission Sponsor (DCNO) organizations and the emphasis
would be on professional development and competition vice
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platform skill. Early broadening of professional horizons
would provide naval officers less parochially inclined and
more objective in outlook for future high-level (Fleet Commanders,
CNO, etc.) assignments.
In summary, the Navy clearly took a step in the right direc-
tion with OPNAVINST 5000.42. However, additional steps to
improve the requirements determination process must be made
before many of the deficiencies identified by the Commission
on Government Procurement and other study groups can be corrected.
The trauma and risk of change can be diminished by careful
implementation of a time-phased plan. The alternative approach
of doing nothing and paying only lip service to outside
criticism does not appear to be in the Navy's best interest,
particularly during this era of increased Congressional awareness.
C. SAMPLE REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION SCENARIO UNDER THE
PROPOSED ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff increase their estimates of
U.S. sealift logistical support required in Western Europe in
support of NATO troops engaged in conventional war with Warsaw
Pact forces.
2. CNO conducts analyses (CPPG/CPAM) and determines that
additional merchant shipping required to meet the Joint Chief's




3. DCNO Sea Control, using inputs from his Director ASW
Programs, updates the Force and Mission Plan and coordinates
with OP-98 in updating the Mission Area Science and Technology
Objectives. After reviewing NAC to determine general state of
the art limitations, a broad draft OR is initiated which states
need for increased capability to protect greater numbers of
merchant convoys in the North Atlantic.
4. The CEB/ARC reviews and approves DCNO Sea Control's
Draft OR. The approved OR is incorporated in the mission R&D
plan and is forwarded to NAVMAT.
5. The Chief of Naval Material (CNM) circulates the OR
among his technical bureaus, laboratories, and research
facilities and solicits development proposals (DPs) to meet the
OR.
6. Technical bureaus, laboratories, and research facilities
respond to the OR with their individual approaches to problem
resolution.
7. CNM collates all DPs and submits them to DCNO Sea Control
as possible alternatives to meet the new operational requirement.
8. DCNO Sea Control and his Director-ASW Programs evaluate
total current ASW program systems capabilities, effectiveness,
and cost and compare these systems/parameters with NAVMAT





















9. Among the alternatives offered in response to the
operational requirement, the following feasible alternatives














10. Within sub-mission area (ASW-Programs) funding con-
straints, DCNO Sea Control concludes that most alternative DPs
offer only marginal improvement in performance at greatly
increased cost. Adoption of any of this type of alternative
will necessitate significant reduction of current ASW force
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assets. DCNO Sea Control, therefore, decides on a strategy
of maintaining his current ASW force level and procuring
Electronic Ship Accoustic Maskers from NAVELEX. This, he
concludes, will be his most cost-effective selection. Although
he must spread his existing force level assets thinner to
protect increased numbers of merchant convoys, the electronic
ship accoustic masker will reduce the accoustic detection
capability of enemy submarines by 807o. Hence, existing ASW
assets will be guarding increased merchant convoys which are
80% less detectible by enemy submarines, and the overall ASW
mission risk to NATO logistical support will have been reduced




Projections of numerous indicators portend potentially
crippling fiscal paralysis of future defense acquisition plans.
Among these, the following loom as perhaps the most significant:
* Increasing ownership cost of defense systems.
* Eroding effect of current inflationary trend on
"real" defense purchasing power.
In addition, increasing Congressional dissatisfaction with
rapidly rising defense budgets and a growing Congressional
predilection for improved and expanded overview (Budget Control
Act of 1974) of administrative budgetary implementation mandate
improved Navy fiscal effectiveness.
Conclusive evidence indicates the need for a rechanneling
of effort in the Navy's OPNAV structure in order to more
effectively discharge its responsibilities in a changing fiscal
environment. Organization of the OPNAV/DCNO structure consistent
with mission instead of platform orientation is recommended not
necessarily to correct failure, but to ensure continued success
in maintaining a viable and capable Navy in a changing
environment.
Organization of the OPNAV structure into the previously
addressed DCNO mission area of: (1) Strategic Deterrence,
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(2) Sea Control, (3) Projection of Power Ashore and (4)
Mission Support will:
1. Place Navy systems under the control of a
cognizant mission DCNO for quicker and more
effective response to changing mission needs
and requirements.
2. Permit cost-effectiveness measurement of
competing systems at various mission organiza-
tional levels.
3. Assign mission authority, responsibility and
accountability to a single DCNO who can be given
clear performance guidelines.
4. Permit comparison of DCNO performance with Navy
goals and objectives.
5. Facilitate an action oriented, future looking
management style.
Thus the goal of the recommended OPNAV organizational
structure is to create a more mission-oriented organization,
capable of optimizing mission area effectiveness within given
budgetary and planning constraints. Given commensurate admin-
istrative and Congressional support, due accountability can be
exacted from those (DCNOs) ceded adequate authority and
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